

24 JUN 1977

Dear George,

I do want to thank you for that lovely water color which you presented to me the other night at the NMIA banquet. I find it an exciting piece of art with a real message behind it. It reposes in my Executive Office Building office and I thoroughly enjoy looking at it every day.

I'm sure that we are all grateful for your dedication to our country and its intelligence effort. I know that I will long be thankful to you for the inspiration of your art and your real thoughtfulness.

Again, many thanks.


Yours,



STANSFIELD TURNER

STATINTL

Mr. George L. Skypeck
35 Schlager Avenue
Quincy, Massachusetts 02169



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GEORGE L. SKYPECK
Free Lance Art & Design


Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Dear Admiral Turner;

Sir, you would do me the greatest honor by accepting this specially drawn sketch and water color depicting the evolution of American defensive power through the ages. Subtly indicated in the prose is the determination of those, whose responsibility is the maintenance of defense through intelligence, to persist in every possible professional manner in the continuation of this nation as a democratic entity. If I had to explain the drive behind creating this piece of art, it would be my own experience in the intelligence field coupled with the realization that intelligence is the basic functioning impetus behind all R&D efforts, and the driving force to identify the required R&D efforts and resultant defense systems as an end product.

In closing sir, may I offer my congratulations on your most important position, and may I say that along with the already long list of important political dignitaries possessing my art work, I would hope that this piece speaks silently of the pride you have brought to the nation and the military.

Sincerely,


George L. Skypeck

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NATIONAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSOCIATION

1977 Annual Convention

Fort Meade Officers' Club

17 June 1977

(15-20 Minutes)

- ° Pleasure to be with you
 - Have been part of IC for relatively short time
 - Learning every day more and more about what parts of the Community do
 - Had no idea until tonight that you were so adept at organizing such a delightful evening as this one
 - You have kept that secret well
 - Thank you for including us this evening
- ° Almost 4 months ago, came to present job with 31 years experience as a military consumer
 - Appreciated the need for good intelligence
 - Appreciated the dogged perseverance which is demanded of our military intelligence community like yourself
 - But really never had the opportunity to influence the process except in very small ways as a commander through requests for specific information I needed in a given situation.

- ° If bring one thing - hope appreciation of military commanders needs
 - Our work must, after all, fulfill the needs of the users of intelligence - while the military customer is not only one IC serves - very important one
- ° More important perhaps than since WWII. Two reasons:
 - (1) Party
 - (2) Soviets recognizing the failure of their system to grow in other ways, have built their world power base on military might. Large amounts of this power is poised along the NATO frontiers in Europe and ranges the high seas. Our NATO allies depend on us to backstop them both with in place forces in Europe and with our fleets at sea. At the same time, we depend on them to present a cohesive line of strong national forces to deter the Soviets from probing or testing on any free world border. The balance is a delicate one and advantages must be really worked for.
- ° If look past military scene - similar situations -
 - (1) Economics
 - (2) Politics - world different - US domination - to situation where evolving nations are going their own way and do not want to be dictated to by either the U.S. or Soviet Russia. Many of our friends tell us our brand of democracy

just won't work everywhere and the Soviets hear the same thing from the European communist parties - each going its own way.

- We must be smart, understand pol/econ/cultural attitudes and take maximum advantage of our potential or we will be outmaneuvered. And, in your field of military intelligence, cannot overlook these needs in pol/econ areas.
- Resources limited
- Assets for collecting and digesting intell limited
- Yet both are ample if we can
 - share assets
 - establish priorities among the many consumer needs, and
 - squeeze the best intelligence estimates/analysis out of the mountains of information we are collecting every day.
- Means 3 things:
 - First: Must Integrate Resources
 - There must be close coordination between national/tactical and between military and civilian intelligence organizations because they are interdependent: neither military nor civilian users of intelligence can charge ahead, making plans without consulting the other.
 - For instance, can't just write "military" contingency plans - they won't work unless you've talked and reached

some agreement with the people who control national assets. Neither military commanders nor our civilian leaders can operate in isolation.

- Second: As develop new technical systems be careful satisfy both tactical military needs and broad national requirements.

Not easy always.

- Third: Determining what are right topics to concentrate intell effort for the future.

- ° Developing intelligence capability is not unlike developing military capability

- takes time
- expensive
- must try to foresee needs before they exist

Not simple. Must analyze trends, understand history, and have some feeling for where the world seems to be going.

- ° Easy be complacent

- refine same old OOB -
- relook same old warning indicators

but:

- 1) technology advancing both sides - are we anticipating
- 2) politics shifting our focus - worry about more countries?
- 3) SALT/MBFR influence on force development

4) employment patterns changing

- you must open imaginations
 - ° everyone knows the story of Pearl Harbor which could have been less of a disaster at least if people hadn't been so sure of themselves that it was safe that they refused to believe the various intelligence warnings
 - ° In 1940, the Germans might have been slowed down at least if the French had not held so resolutely to the belief that the Maginot Line was impenetrable and that the Germans, if they attacked, would use classic tactics and routes.
 - ° The U-2 with Gary Powers might not have been shot down resulting in the scuttling of the European summit if we had done a better intelligence job of estimating Soviet anti-aircraft capabilities.
- ° Conclusion. How does this all affect you - members of the military intelligence community?
 - ° Aware that
 - world changing - more complex
 - your job becoming more difficult, rather than easier
 - ° Appreciate need to interact/talk with national/civilian intelligence community

- growing interdependency
- ° Know that your contribution is increasing in importance
 - intelligence is indispensable to decision-making
 - President Carter anxious to support IC and encourages our efforts to improve our product
 - Greater appreciation in government as a whole and by the public for intelligence effort as more and more consumers see your product and grow to depend on it.
- ° Commend you for your important contribution; urge you to be innovative and participate creatively in the changes which are taking place now.
- ° Thank you for a lovely evening.

N. M. I. A.

National Military Intelligence Association

1606 LAUREL LANE, ROUTE 10. — ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21401



27 November 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington D. C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

A copy of the first issue of the American Intelligence Journal is enclosed for your information. Thank you very much for being a part of this issue - a very important part - and for your assistance in making it a success by allowing your talk to the National Military Intelligence Association to be published.

I hope the Journal will fill a need to better cement understanding between members of the Intelligence Community in the various Departments and Agencies. I hope that the Journal can be a forum which will be useful in promoting the Community's point of view as an unofficial spokesman.

The Association presently has about two thousand members and is growing each day.


Once again, thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to read "Chuck Thomann". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Charles E. Thomann
Colonel (USA Retired)
Executive Secretary

American



Fall 1977

INTELLIGENCE ★ ★ JOURNAL



ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN,
Director, Central Intelligence,

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The American

INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL *****

published by the NATIONAL MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE ASSOCIATION, INC.

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THE PRESIDENT'S CORNER

It is an honor to have been elected President of the NATIONAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSOCIATION for the coming year. I believe strongly in the purpose and aspirations of the organization and will do my utmost to see that the NMIA moves forward during the twelve months of my stewardship. I am fortunate to have a talented, dedicated staff and a resolute Board of Advisors. I am counting heavily on them for advice and support.

I have been associated with NMIA for several years. During that time, I have watched the organization mature and expand its organizational base to several thousand members. As with most organizations, we experienced growing pains. We watched in frustration as our membership increased beyond our capability to adequately administer. No longer could we handle our burgeoning Chapters on a part-time basis. We temporarily solved that problem with the installation of a full-time Executive Secretary. This action helped our administrative operation significantly. However, another step was needed. If we were to measure up truly to the requirements of a national organization, we had to move the base of operation to a national location. Thus, in 1977, our office was relocated to Annapolis, Maryland. We look forward to the day we can establish a full-fledged executive office in Washington, D.C.



Colonel Bill C. Powell, President

One other action was required before the NMIA could attain status as a national voice for intelligence. The NMIA originated under the auspices of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Naturally, its initial representation was principally Army. Beginning in 1976, we sought to broaden the base of the organization to include other Services and civilian component agencies. We are well on our way to achieve this goal, having recently included Air Force and Navy representation on our Board of Directors. As a consequence, we have dropped MI Magazine, an all-Army publication, as a requisite for national membership, a somewhat painful but necessary step to achieving truly national status. In its place, we are expanding the size and scope of the NMIA DIGEST to provide broader coverage to the membership. We intend to publish eventually a first-class magazine with enough commercial advertisements to finance most of our administrative operation.

NMIA is on the verge of taking off strongly as an effective voice for the intelligence community. It has been a struggle getting there. It will be an even tougher battle to stay there. My plans for seeing us stay there are centered around three goals:

GOAL NUMBER ONE is to accelerate actions associated with getting our administrative house in order. Specifically, we want to establish a first-class office in the District of Columbia capable of handling the administrative requirements of the Chapters as well as begin making representative contacts with influential groups in the District. We have an excellent opportunity to do this under the managership of Chuck Thomann, our Past President, who has taken the job of Executive Secretary. If anyone can do it, he can.

GOAL NUMBER TWO is to improve our means of getting news about NMIA to the membership. We intend to enlarge the DIGEST and increase its scope of coverage, targeted specifically toward informing the membership of local happenings. We want to publish it at least quarterly, timed to insure the membership of advanced information on events of national importance. Additionally, we will pursue publication of the annual revenue-producing magazine, I previously mentioned.

GOAL NUMBER THREE is to expand NMIA's base of operations to the extent that it must be a truly national organization. I believe the strength of NMIA lies in its individual members. Therefore, each Chapter must strive to give its membership programs of varied intellectual and social significance in order that a broad base of representation may be achieved and maintained. Chapters consisting primarily of one Service should strive to include other Services and civilian agency representatives among their membership and in their organizational structure.

Mechanisms must be established to bring the collective views of Chapters before the Board at the national level.

NMIA is well on its way to achieving its organizational goal. With the help of us all, we'll get there!

BILL C. POWELL,
Colonel, MI
President



Editor's Opinion ~~~~~

We have an obvious problem in perspective when it comes to the subject of electronic eavesdropping. Nobody catches more flack on the subject than the FBI and CIA when they monitor the telephone of a private citizen who is suspected of espionage. One is puzzled, however, as to why these same critics - who are so vocal when it comes to United States government agents - are so strangely quiet when it comes to the Soviet government's electronic eavesdropping, which is a far greater and more ominous threat to the rights of individual privacy and ultimately to our very liberty.

As most of you know, almost 70 percent of all American long distance telephone conversations are transmitted by radio microwave signals. Any such signal can be intercepted and the Soviets not only intercept many telephone calls, but use high speed computers to sort out the information they want. Most of this effort is reportedly focused on American government officials and businessmen and represents a threat of massive proportion to the security of this country. (It goes without saying that it would also aid immeasurably in the recruitment of fellow travelers and espionage agents as well as for targeting purposes.)

Soviet electronic eavesdropping efforts are well documented and even officially acknowledged. Reportedly, Soviet communications intercept equipment for this purpose is located at sea off our shores as well as in their diplomatic missions around the United States -- Washington, D.C., New York, and San Francisco. Millions of American telephone conversations are now on Soviet computers -- a frightening FACT.

Despite this knowledge, our government has done little but protest. In testimony before the Senate in July, it was brought out that our own laws protect the Soviets. They may eavesdrop all they want -- and the United States will do nothing to retaliate. Government efforts to preclude Soviet snooping of this sort are essentially passive.

Senator Moynihan of New York has introduced a Bill (S.1950) which would make Soviet eavesdropping a criminal offense and any diplomat engaging in such an act would be subject to being declared persona non grata with the attendant withdrawal of the diplomat to be effected. This is a start, but more action than this is needed. Such a law should have been ON THE BOOKS long before our own Agencies were taken to task for trying to protect our Nation from a growing Communist threat.

Teddy Roosevelt admonished us to "speak softly, but carry a big stick." If a Nation will not protect the rights of its own citizens WITHIN ITS OWN BORDERS, can it be expected to protect them elsewhere? If the citizens of that Nation, by their inaction allow their government to abrogate its responsibilities, have they not received the kind of government they deserve!?

1977 CONVENTION HIGHLIGHTS

!CONVENTION A GREAT SUCCESS AT FORT MEADE!

The largest Convention in NMIA history was hosted by the CHESAPEAKE CHAPTER at Fort Meade on 16 and 17 June 1977. Captain Barry Miner, USA and CSM Francis McCann, USA provided the leadership, while other members of the Chapter pitched in to assure that the many details of engineering a successful convention were very handily administered. NMIA members present unanimously voted a "WELL DONE" to the CHESAPEAKE CHAPTER for their efforts. President Charles E. Thomann, in remarks to the general membership, said that the success of the Convention proved NMIA was a viable organization with a promising future.

Highlighting the Convention was the NMIA Banquet and Ball on 17 June which featured a keynote address by Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Admiral Turner's remarks are printed elsewhere in this issue. During the banquet, the winners of the NMIA Scholarship Awards were announced; several honorary Life Memberships were awarded and the leadership of the Association was turned over to the newly elected President, Colonel Bill C. Powell, USA. The over 400 members and guests who attended the final evening of the Convention ended the festivities by listening to a concert by the Army Chorus of Fort Meade and dancing.

On 16 June 1977, LTG Harold R. Aaron, USA, then Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army, conducted a highly informative afternoon Seminar on the role of military intelligence in National decision-making. About 100 members were present.

The General Membership Meeting convened on 17 June and a number of items important to the membership and the future of NMIA were thoroughly discussed. A number of Committee Reports were presented and will be covered in future issues of the JOURNAL. The results of the Members meeting are outlined below:

- It was decided to raise the annual dues to \$10.00 per person. The raise being necessitated to offset the rising costs of maintaining the membership, and to build the treasury so that a professional magazine can be published. A five year membership fee of \$40.00 and a Life Membership fee of \$150.00 were also approved.
- It was reaffirmed that MI MAGAZINE subscriptions should no longer be a condition of membership. These subscriptions having caused a considerable drain on the treasury. Further, it was noted that MI MAGAZINE does not project the multi-Service image which NMIA is striving to attain.
- It was decided that a National Chapter should be formed at NMIA Headquarters for those members who are not otherwise members of Chapters. Emphasis is to be placed during the coming year on Chapter organization and consolidation. The National Chapter will be administered by the Executive Secretary.
- It was decided that the Chapters should be the primary agents for the recruitment of new members, and would be responsible for collecting and forwarding National dues of new members to the National Headquarters.
- It was decided that Chapters may issue official Membership cards provided that National Headquarters is promptly notified.

ed that the member has joined, or rejoined; that dues are received at the same time of notification; and that a clear notation is made that the member has received an official Membership card. Cards are available from National Headquarters upon request. Many Chapters issue local cards for their own purposes. Such cards, while not discouraged, are not official and may not take the place of the official card. National Headquarters must continue to send out notification of membership renewal to individual members. Members, however, may return their renewal card and dues through the Chapter or to National Headquarters directly. Eventually, it is hoped that a system can be devised whereby National Headquarters can inform Chapters of renewals and collection of dues can be effected at the local level.

- It was decided that more emphasis should be made to attract enlisted and NCO members and that Chapters should make every effort to assure that the members of all Services, to include Reserve forces and National Guard, are invited to become members of the National Military Intelligence Association.
- It was announced that the Scholarship Committee had selected: MISS ROBIN JANE WATT, daughter of Major & Mrs. "Scotty" Watt of Fort Meade, Maryland to receive NMIA's top scholarship of \$600. (Miss Watt will attend the University of Maryland.) MR. MARK R. GRIEFE, son of LTC & Mrs. John Griefe of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas was selected as First Runnerup and will receive a \$400 scholarship. (Mr. Griefe will attend Stanford University.) Second Runnerup was MR. MARK C. MCGLADE, son of COL & Mrs. Joseph G. McGlade of San Antonio, Texas. Mark to receive a \$200 scholarship. (Mark is attending the University of Texas.)
- It was decided that the value of the Scholarship Awards should be increased, if possible. It was further recommended that all awards be of an equal amount.
- It was decided that each Chapter may initiate its own Scholarship fund drive to benefit local members. However, it was stressed that the National Scholarship Fund must continue to be supported as well.
- It was decided not to extend membership to any foreign country personnel. This decision was based largely on votes received from members who were not present but who responded to questions in the May DIGEST and forwarded their proxy.
- It was decided to enlarge the duties of the Executive Secretary as outlined in the May issue of the DIGEST.
- It was decided that NMIA may form a separate corporation with AFIO in order to publish a professional magazine if costs and benefits are equally shared by the two organizations.
- It was decided that the 1978 Convention will be held in Kileen, Texas and would be hosted by the BLUE WATCH CHAPTER of Fort Hood, Texas.
- Life Memberships for service were awarded to LTG Alva Fitch, former Deputy Director, DIA and "father" of the Army Military Intelligence Branch. To LTG Harold R. Aaron, former Army ACSI and presently Deputy Director, DIA for his service in forming NMIA. To LTC Jim Chambers, former Executive Secretary of NMIA for his services to the Association. To Major Ronald Jernigan, former Secretary/Treasurer of NMIA for his services to the

-- New Members of the Board of Directors were elected as follows:

LCDR Calland F. Carnes, USNR, POTOMAC CHAPTER
MAJ Percy G. Rogers, USAF, POTOMAC CHAPTER
CPT Barry Miner, USA, CHESAPEAKE CHAPTER
SGT (P) Lawrence Fox, USA, GOLD VAULT CHAPTER

-- NEW OFFICERS for the coming year were elected as follows:

PRESIDENT - Colonel William "Bill" Powell, USA
HERITAGE CHAPTER
VICE PRESIDENT - CSM (Ret.) Francis McCann, USA
CHESAPEAKE CHAPTER
SECRETARY/TREASURER - LCDR Calland F. Carnes, USNR
POTOMAC CHAPTER
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY - Colonel (Ret.) Charles E. Thomann, USA,
NATIONAL CHAPTER

SCHOLARSHIPS AWARDED

The National Military Intelligence Association's 1977 Scholarship Awards were announced at the 1977 Convention Banquet and Ball on 17 June 1977. As stated in the Convention Highlights Article, MISS ROBIN JANE WATT, daughter of Major and Mrs. Murray "Scotty" Watt of Fort Meade, Maryland received the first prize of \$600. MSG P. R. Fazenbaker, who headed the Scholarship Committee this year reported that the choice was very difficult because all applicants were very well qualified, but the Committee was highly impressed with Robin's qualifications and after much deliberation, declared her the winner.

First Runner-up was MARK GRIEFE, son of LTC and Mrs. John Griefe of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Second Runner-up was MARK McGLADE, son of Colonel and Mrs. Joseph McGlade of Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Robin was present at the Convention Banquet when the awards were announced. Her parents had been brought in on the secret and convinced Robin that she should attend as a matter of interest and to hear Admiral Turner's address. As a result, the announcement of her name as the winner came as a complete surprise. Since many of the members present that evening knew Robin had been selected, it is to the credit of Military Intelligence personnel everywhere that the secret was so well kept.

Robin is currently attending the University of Maryland having graduated from Arundel Senior High School, Gambrills, Maryland this year. Robin graduated with honors, as did all of our applicants. The Scholarship Committee was particularly impressed with Robin's interest in being involved not only with her school but with her Community. Robin has been a member of the Student Government, held office in various clubs, been active in music and sports and has done extensive volunteer work for charitable organizations. In addition, she has worked at two jobs to help pay her own expenses through college. Robin is, in short, always busy doing those things which will help herself and others.

NMIA IS VERY PROUD OF ROBIN WATT, MARK GRIEFE, AND MARK McGLADE!

!CONGRATULATIONS!

ADDRESS OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN,
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1977 ANNUAL CONVENTION
OF THE
NATIONAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSOCIATION
17 June 1977

First, let me tell you what a pleasure it is to be with you. I have been learning every day more and more about what certain segments of the intelligence community do, but I had no idea, until tonight, that you were so adept at organizing such a delightful evening as this one. You have kept that secret well! Mrs. Turner and I want to thank you for allowing us to join you at the 1977 Annual Convention of the National Military Intelligence Association.

I think you all know that about four months ago, I came to my present job having been selected by my former classmate, now the President, Jimmy Carter. What you may not know is that I bring with me 31 years of experience in intelligence -- all of it as a consumer -- until four months ago!

Throughout my career, I have had a keen awareness of the need for good intelligence and have appreciated the dogged perseverance which is demanded of the military intelligence community. Until recently, though, I have never had the opportunity to influence the process except in very small ways as a Commander through requests for specific information.

I think that perhaps the greatest qualification I bring to my present job is an appreciation of the military commander's need for intelligence. Our work, yours and mine, must, after all, fulfill the requirements of the users of intelligence and although the military consumer is not the only one the intelligence community must serve, the military consumer is a very important one.

It seems to me that the importance of intelligence -- good intelligence -- at this point in history is even greater than during World War II -- for two reasons. The first of which is that nearly unmeasurable commodity, or word, "parity." It is the precise assessment and the attainment of this illusive "parity" upon which our future security and the peace of the world rests.

Second, the Soviets, recognizing the weaknesses in their economic and political system, have built their world power base on military might. Large amounts of this military might are poised along the NATO frontiers in Europe and range the high seas. Our allies depend on us to backstop them both with in-place forces in Europe and with our fleets at sea. The balance is a delicate one which must be continually assessed and evaluated and this can only be accomplished by the application of good intelligence.

All of us in this room tonight recognize the similarities of times past. Times of economic uncertainties in much of the world, but many of us in this room are experiencing a new sensation in the political world -- different from the times we have known when the United States was THE dominant world power to a situation where emerging nations are capable of going their own way and do not want to be dictated to by either the United States or the Soviet Union. Many of our friends tell us our brand of democracy just won't work everywhere. And the Soviets hear the same thing from the European communist parties -- their brand of communism just won't work everywhere.

The intelligence community must be alert to changes, not only in the military forces of the world, but to the political and economic changes which, after all, are the motivating reasons for the deployment of those military forces.

Our resources are limited -- so we must share them.

We must share our assets.

We must establish priorities among the many consumer needs and demands so that we may squeeze the best intelligence estimates and analyses out of the mountains of information we are collecting every day.

In order to effectively do this, we must--

██████ INTEGRATE OUR RESOURCES. There must be close coordination between national and tactical organizations. Between military and civilian intelligence organizations and, because they are interdependent, neither the military nor the civilian users of intelligence can charge ahead, making plans, consuming finite resources without consulting with each other.

For instance, you can't just write "military" contingency intelligence plans. They won't work unless you have talked with and reached some agreement with the people who control national intelligence assets. To put it quite simply, neither the military nor the civilian intelligence organizations can operate in isolation.

██████ As we DEVELOP NEW TECHNICAL SYSTEMS, we must be careful to insure that they satisfy both the tactical military needs and the broad national requirements. This is not an easy task and requires, no demands, consummate teamwork.

██████ We must DETERMINE where FUTURE INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS should be channeled. And it is this final point that carries with it the weight of the world because if we are wrong -- if we make a critical miscalculation -- we may not get a second chance.

Developing our intelligence capability for tomorrow is not unlike developing military capability. It takes time (and none of us know how much time we have). It is expensive (so resources may not be squandered). And, it requires the capability to foresee needs before they exist!

As I told you, it isn't simple, and by now, you know that I didn't come here to tell you it was going to be easy. Good intelligence, as we all know, is the proper analyzation of trends coupled with the perspective of history and a feeling of where the world seems to be going.

We must be constantly vigilant lest we become complacent. It is not going to be good enough to refine and redefine the same old order of battle.

We cannot relook at the same old warning indicators and overlook the new, subtle changes, that will herald the coming of a new danger.

We cannot afford to forget that technology is advancing -- on both sides.

We must constantly ask ourselves, "Are we anticipating"?

We must neither allow our attention to be misdirected; nor can we allow it to become so fixed that we cannot perceive the changes occurring around us.

We must open our imaginations -- while at the same time not allowing ourselves to conjure up hallucinations.

Everyone knows the story of Pearl Harbor which could have been less of a disaster if people hadn't been so sure of themselves that they refused to believe the various intelligence warnings which foretold the possibility of attack.

In 1940, the Germans might have been slowed down at least, and perhaps stopped if the French had not held so tenaciously to the belief that the Maginot Line was impenetrable and that the Germans, if they dared to attack, would use classic tactics and routes.

The U-2, with Gary Powers at the controls, might not have been shot down resulting in the scuttling of the European Summit Talks if we had done a better job of estimating Soviet anti-aircraft capabilities.

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Now, how does all this affect you, the members of the military intelligence community?

It means that we must be poignantly aware that the world is constantly changing and that your job is becoming more difficult and your absolute top performance imperative.

Finally, I want you to know that President Carter views the contribution of the intelligence community as indispensable. He has expressed his pleasure with the intelligence input which he receives and has told me of the great reliance which he places on the written and oral briefings he receives. He has asked me to express to you his support of the intelligence community and encourages our efforts to improve our product.

Before I leave, I want to commend you for your important contribution and urge you to be innovative and participate creatively in the changes which are now taking place.

Thank you for a lovely evening.

ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, United States Navy, was sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence on March 9, 1977. In this position, and since the reorganization of the Intelligence resources of the United States, he heads the Intelligence Community as well as directs the Central Intelligence Agency.

A native of Highland Park, Illinois, Admiral Turner was appointed to the United States Naval Academy. After graduation in 1946 (Class of 1947), he served one year at sea before entering Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar to work on a master's degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics.

Following Oxford, he held a variety of sea assignments - including command of a minesweeper, a destroyer, and a guided missile frigate. His shore assignments included the Politico-Military Policy Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis; the Advanced Management Program of the Harvard Business School, and was Executive Assistant and Naval Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.

He was selected for promotion to Rear Admiral in May, 1970, and shortly thereafter assumed command of a Carrier Task Group of the SIXTH Fleet. On June 30, 1972, Admiral Turner became the 36th President of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, with the rank of Vice Admiral. In August of 1974, he became Commander of the United States SECOND Fleet and NATO Strike Fleet-Atlantic. He served in that capacity until August, 1975, when he was named Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), with headquarters in Naples, Italy. Upon assuming that position on September 1, 1975, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral. He held this command until his departure on March 2, 1977, to assume his present duties.

AUTHOR AUTHOR AUTHOR

The AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL is your forum. NMIA members are urged to contribute articles for future editions. We need your experiences and thoughts to share with others. We need articles from intelligence professionals of all services ranging from tactical, technical and strategic - to the controversial and hopefully thought provoking.

The Editor of the AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL reserves the right to edit articles, as necessary, to fit format and to select or reject articles for publication. Manuscripts will not be returned unless requested.

The SPY Glass

GRAHAM versus PRM-10

LTG Daniel O. Graham (USA Ret.) and past President of NMIA, has attacked Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM-10) in an article prepared for the fall issue of STRATEGIC REVIEW. PRM-10 suggests that the United States might let the Soviets invade and occupy one third of West Germany and "trust to world opinion to force a Russian withdrawal." Graham describes the Carter Administration as dominated by the "Peace Through Trust" crowd (Doves), as opposed by the "Peace Through Strength" group (Hawks). "It is clear," says Graham, "that each of the two basic points of view has its own internal logic. The national imperative is to examine these two schools of thought in the light of evidence at hand to determine which should be the basis for a national strategy." (AS WE GO TO PRESS, GENERAL GRAHAM IS RECOVERING IN THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA FROM A POSSIBLE HEART ATTACK.)

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO WARN CONGRESS

As we go to press, the Washington Post reports that a Senate subcommittee is preparing legislation that would require U.S. Intelligence agencies to warn Congress when its members are approached by individuals who may be agents of foreign governments. The proposed legislation stems from the recent South Korean influence buying scandal and is part of an effort by the Congress to write legislation prescribing the actions of government security agencies. According to the Post, the legislation reflects the suspicion that CIA knew about the South Korean scheme to influence Congress in the early 1970's but failed to warn Congress. The Department of Defense is also catching its share of blame for not having warned members of Congress.

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

During September, the Constitution Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on Senate Bill S.1845. This bill concerns the Polygraph Control and Civil Liberties Protection Act of 1977. Hearings are scheduled to resume on 9 and 10 November.

In October, the House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East began hearings on how domestic forces within the Soviet Union influence Soviet foreign policy actions.

Also in October, the Senate Judiciary Committee considered S.1566, a bill which establishes procedures for electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence. For copies of these Bills, write to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Room 2226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510. Chairman: Senator James O. Eastland (D-Mississippi).

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

In response to several requests, following is the listing of the members of that Committee. (The Committee address is: Room 308, Russell Senate Office Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20510).

DANIEL K. INOUE, D-Hawaii, Chairman
 Birch Bayh, D-Indiana
 Adlai E. Stevenson, D-Illinois
 William D. Hathaway, D-Maine
 Walter D. Huddleston, D-Kentucky
 Joseph R. Biden, Jr., D-Delaware
 Robert Morgan, D-North Carolina
 Gary Hart, D-Colorado
 Daniel P. Moynihan, D-New York
 Robert C. Byrd, D-West Virginia,
 Ex-Officio Member

BARRY GOLDWATER, R-Arizona,
 Vice Chairman
 Clifford P. Case, R-New Jersey
 Jake Garn, R-Utah
 Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., R-Maryland
 James Pearson, R-Kansas
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 Richard Lugar, R-Indiana
 Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyoming
 Howard Baker, Jr., R-Tennessee,
 Ex-Officio Member

Sincerley, 006

TREATY OR TRAVESTY?

THE PANAMA CANAL

The controversy over the Panama Canal Treaties has become a political issue of massive importance as well as a highly charged emotional topic. When such an issue emerges at the Washington level, both sides pull no punches and too often the facts of the case, or the real seriousness of the issue, become totally obscured while the struggle for power takes center stage.

It is important, therefore, that the Membership be kept well informed so that they can judge the issue on its own merit, despite the storm of words and the bias of the factions. The JOURNAL in this issue, will present a Backgrounder on the Panama Canal and in the next issue, an analysis of the Treaties, themselves. Our purpose is educational and nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the Association. If you personally feel strongly on this, or any other issue you should, as a citizen, inform your Congressman of your views. The JOURNAL will also be pleased to publish "Letters to the Editor" on this, or any other subject -- provided they are in good taste and are signed. Signatures will be withheld, on request.

BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

EARLY INTEREST

Almost two centuries ago, there was evidence of multi-national interest in the construction of a connecting waterway through Central America. Spain had contemplated building a canal across the isthmus as early as 1814, but the Spanish imperial power collapsed at about that time and the construction was never started. Both the United States and Britain expressed interest in a canal either across the isthmus, or through Nicaragua. In 1878, a French company attempted to build a canal across the isthmus, but beset by graft, tropical diseases, and engineering problems, the enterprise went twice bankrupt and finally collapsed in 1887. The river canal through Nicaragua begun the same year by American entrepreneurs went bankrupt three years later.

The Spooner Act of 1902 authorized the United States to negotiate with Colombia for a canal route, and if the negotiations with Colombia failed, to negotiate with Nicaragua. The Spooner Act mandated the President to obtain perpetual control of the necessary territory. Negotiations with Colombia led to the Hay-Herran Treaty of 1903. That treaty included a concession of 100 years, renewable at the option of the United States.

During the time of the negotiations, Colombia was being pressed by revolutionaries. In a state of siege, the government was administratively disorganized and in troubled financial straits. Colombia was anxious to have the canal as a source of revenue which could aid its recovery. Moreover, there existed the possibility that if the canal were not built through the isthmus of Panama, the province of Panama might well revolt. Colombia's negotiator with the United States wrote to the head of his government:

. . .the Panamanians. . .will never willingly submit to the opening of the canal in any other place than at the isthmus. They understand very well that the adoption of the Nicaragua route will be the moral and material ruin of Panama; and this sacrifice, which will have no compensations, may very well prove superior to the concept of a platonic patriotism.

The Hay-Herran Treaty of 1903 was ratified by the United States Congress, but during the seven months between the end of the civil war in Colombia (November,

1902) and the meeting of its Congress (June, 1903) a number of Colombian objections to the treaty arose and the Colombian Congress never ratified it. With the failure of this treaty, the United States prepared to negotiate with Nicaragua in accordance with the Spooner Act.

CREATION OF PANAMA

From the beginning, Panama was geographically and psychologically separated from the rest of Colombia by the mountainous terrain. Since Colombia's independence from Spain, there had been several eruptions of Panamanian discontent in an effort to establish an independent Panamanian state. Panamanians were fairly vocal in warning that should Colombia fail to ratify the treaty, rebellion would result on the isthmus. Not quite three months after Colombia's rejection of the treaty, Panama declared its independence in a virtually bloodless coup. Colombia agreed to recognize the Republic of Panama in return for an indemnity of \$25 million, special transportation privileges, and a United States apology. The apology was never forthcoming.

ACQUISITION OF THE ZONE

Shortly after its declaration of independence, the provisional government of Panama offered to the United States what is known today as the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903. This treaty incorporated the Hay-Herran treaty, but also widened the Zone to ten miles and more clearly stipulated American sovereignty over the Zone. It contained a sovereignty clause which granted the United States, "all rights, power and authority within the Zone. . . which the United States would possess and exercise as if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said land and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise of the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority." The treaty was amended in 1936 and in 1955, but the sovereignty and perpetuity clauses have not been disturbed.

Further, in addition to acquiring the Zone by treaty, the United States paid Panama \$10 million as "price or compensation" plus a \$250,000 annuity (raised first to \$430,000 and currently at \$2,328,000). This was not rent, as sometimes alleged, but rather payment to cover a loss of the annual franchise payment to the Panamanian Railroad as the result of American acquisition of sovereignty.

Private claims were bought at fair market value which was set by a United States-Panama Joint Commission. Property transfers, in addition to private titles and claims include property in Panama City and Colon (1943) - \$11,759,956; a water system in those two cities - \$669,226; and 1955 Treaty transfers - \$22,260,500. For a comparison, the following may be of interest:

1803 Louisiana Purchase.	\$15.0 Million
1821 Florida Purchase.	\$ 6.7 Million
1848 Mexican Cession, including California	\$15.0 Million
1853 Gadsden Purchase.	\$10.0 Million
1867 Alaska Purchase	\$ 7.2 Million

IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE WESTERN WORLD

ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE

The Canal is important to the United States and to the entire free world; to close it would cause considerable dislocation in the economies of the Western world. For example, an average of about 70% of all cargo sent through the Canal either originates in or is bound for the United States. Japan sends about one-third of its oceanic trade through the Canal, and when viewed in terms of specific trade patterns, curtailment of its use of the Canal could bring economic disruption not only to Japan but also to the United States and the rest of the Western world. Great Brit-

ain is consistently second or third largest user of the Canal -- with over 60% of British-registered shipping crossing the oceans via the Panama Canal.

For Latin American countries, the trade through the Canal is quite significant. The trade in particular between the countries of South America's West Coast and the Gulf and East Coast States of the United States relies heavily upon the use of the Panama Canal. For example, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Ecuador send, respectively, 55.1%, 68.1% and 72.4% of their oceanic trade through the Canal. Countries such as Australia and New Zealand rely on the Canal to reach vital European markets. All have a keen interest in the smooth and indiscriminatory operation of the canal.

It is not only the volume of trade passing through the Canal, but its diversity which is also an important factor in the significance of the Canal. The diversity of the trade passing through the Panama Canal can be contrasted with that going through the Suez Canal -- chiefly oil -- and for that reason too, disruptions in economies would be more severe if the Panama Canal were to be inoperative than were the Suez Canal to be closed. Not to be overlooked is the amount of fuel saved by each ship in avoiding the additional 8,000 mile journey around the Horn.

In sum, continued access for all countries, and at reasonable rates, is important to the economies of the entire Western world. For these reasons, the issue of a new treaty is broader than a United States-Panama, or a United States-Latin American concern.

MILITARY IMPORTANCE

The military importance of the canal can be easily recognized when it is realized that the distance around the Horn represents several weeks of additional sailing time when compared to the route across the isthmus. Our modern Navy stresses smaller, speedier ships, nuclear power, and independent missile capability. The Panama Canal is an important aspect of our assurance of speed and mobility.

Except for the large aircraft carriers, our Naval fleet can travel through the Canal; thus allowing our Naval planners a great deal of flexibility and versatility. Without the use of the Canal, the United States would need a larger ("two ocean") Navy, with larger storage and harbor facilities on both the East and West Coasts. Additionally, the United States would have to provide additional merchant ships and escorts, and fuel. Interocean mobility would be threatened, both for the United States and for our allies.

BENEFITS TO PANAMA

Income generated by the Canal makes a large contribution to the Panamanian economy. During 1976, it included over \$29 million generated in direct purchases in Panama by United States government agencies; over \$108 million in wages to non-U.S. citizens employed in the Zone; expenditures in Panama of United States employees of over \$39 million; and an annuity of over \$2 million. The United States has contributed substantially in various ways to Panama's well-being. construction of the Canal encouraged a large infusion of capital and employment; United States' health officers' battle against yellow fever transformed the Zone, as well as Panama City and Colon from a tropical graveyard into a relatively healthful location; the United States constructed and maintains the Transisthmian Highway; and is constructing the Balboa Bridge. The United States has also contributed to various technical and special assistance programs, and United States private investments amount to about 50% of the private capital invested in Panama.

Numerous special assistance programs have been instituted for the benefit of Panamanians, such as cooperative education programs, apprenticeship programs, office service intern programs, leadership programs, and Latin American student assistant employment programs.

In 1975, the economic aid to Panama from the United States amounted to \$21.8 million. During 1976, total payments and income flow to Panama generated by the

SPECIAL INTERESTS

UNITED STATES BANKS

Maintaining the favorable climate for international banking currently enjoyed in Panama is one major reason cited by those who allege that the rush toward a new treaty is propelled by special interests. In 1970, Torrijos reorganized the country's banking laws to allow international banking transactions free of taxation, together with other advantages, which resulted in the unprecedented expansion of the banking industry in Panama. Today, it is alleged that those institutions, having provided loans to Panama's sagging economy, favor a new treaty with increased annual payments in order to insure that Panama will be able to repay its debts to these institutions.

It has been noted that Mr. Linowitz, the chief co-negotiator of the new treaty, sits on the board of directors of a bank that has made a number of risky loans to Panama's troubled economy. This situation has raised questions of possible conflict of interest among the Congress and the public.

It is interesting to note that Mr. Linowitz' appointment was a special short-term appointment of only six months; thus precluding the opportunity for the Senate to question him regarding possible conflicts of interest through the formal procedure of advice and consent. The rush toward agreement to the broad treaty concepts came just hours before the Linowitz appointment expired.

PANAMA ECONOMY

Economic conditions in Panama have grown steadily worse over the years. Panama's indebtedness has grown from \$167 million when Torrijos took power to approximately \$1.5 billion currently. It is estimated that debt service alone will consume 39% of that country's budget this year (compared with 7% in the United States) and Panama's Department of Planning indicates that to refinance loans coming due, together with the deficit of \$139 million, will require a total of \$323.6 million. A document from the Department of Planning for Panama states (in translation) that "...it will be extremely difficult to syndicate loans with the commercial banks in the amounts previously mentioned. ..." Also, "...the relation between servicing the debt, and current revenues... suggest a deteriorating capacity to service this debt."

The financial situation has been aggravated by government measures which result in pricing Panama's exports out of the world market, through imposition of minimum wage, price supports, and rent control.

In light of the foregoing, the financial arrangements of the Treaty will be crucial to Torrijos in shoring up his sagging regime. He had originally requested a payment from the United States of \$5 billion, together with an annuity of \$300 million until the year 2000. He was persuaded to accept the current figure of about \$50 million per year, plus a generous military and economic aid package of approximately \$350 million.

TOWARD A NEW TREATY

DEMONSTRATIONS

In 1960, President Eisenhower allowed Panamanian students in the Zone area to fly the Panamanian flag beside the American flag. (The 1903 Treaty had prohibited this.) Regardless of intent, however, this decision led Panamanians to believe that they did have some sovereignty within the Zone. The House of Representatives then passed a resolution by a vote of 382-12, opposing the display of the Panamanian

flag on United States Canal Zone territory. Panamanians continued to press for some control over the Zone.

In January, 1964, extensive rioting took place in conjunction with a further dispute surrounding the flying of Panamanian flags in the Canal Zone. The Panamanians did little to restore order and before the rioting ended, four Americans and eighteen Panamanians were killed and \$200 million in property damage had taken place. Limited American force was used to help restore order and Panama broke off diplomatic relations and charged aggression against the United States before the Organization of American States. At the time, President Johnson stated that "...violence is never justified and is never a basis for talks." But in September, he announced the United States would engage in negotiations with the Panamanian government.

KISSINGER TALK PRINCIPLES

The basic concepts of the Joint Statement between the United States and Panama were established by President Johnson after the Communist-inspired riots of 1964. Offered as a response to a manipulated crises, the concepts are now offered as a permanent solution. These principles have served as the basis for discussions regarding the new treaty. In brief, they are as follows:

1. The Treaty of 1903 and its amendments will be abrogated by the conclusion of an entirely new interoceanic canal treaty.
2. The concept of perpetuity will be eliminated. The new treaty concerning the lock canal shall have a fixed termination date.
3. Termination of United States jurisdiction over Panamanian territory shall take place promptly in accordance with terms specified in the treaty.
4. The Republic of Panama shall be the sovereign over the Panama Canal Zone. During the life of the treaty, Panama shall grant to the United States the right to use the lands, water and airspace necessary for operation, maintenance and defense of the Canal and the transit of ships.
5. Panama will have a "just and equitable share" of the benefits derived from the operation of the Canal in its territory.
6. Panama shall participate in the administration of the Canal and will have total responsibility for the operation of the Canal upon the termination of the treaty. Panama shall grant to the United States the rights necessary to regulate, operate, maintain and protect the Canal, and to take specific steps related to those ends as agreed upon in the treaty.
7. Panama shall participate with the United States in defense of the Canal.
8. There shall be bilateral provisions for new projects to enlarge and improve the Canal. These shall be incorporated in the treaty.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR ARGUMENTS

1. The United States is entering upon a new era in its dealings with Latin America, and, indeed, with the entire underdeveloped world. Former Secretary of State Kissinger spoke of a "new dialogue" with Latin America. The trip to Central and South America by First Lady Rosalyn Carter indicates President Carter's strong interest. Many of the regimes are nationalistic, militaristic and socialistic to an unprecedented degree. They are more confident of themselves and can no longer be counted on to support the United States as they did in the past. Even our closest allies in Latin America publicly favor a revision in the status quo. They support Panamanian aspirations and will judge the United States by how we respond.

2. The situation, as it now stands, is potentially violent. There have been riots and demonstrations in the past. The Panamanian government has served notice that it will become a "thorn" to the United States if the treaty now submitted is rejected. Panamanian Ambassador Gabriel Lewis, for example, warned that if the negotiations fail, there will be such a storm of protest that the United States "will have no other alternative than to let it (the Canal) go." Violence could disrupt transit and make it politically embarrassing for the United States to continue to cling to the Canal. Even if sufficient forces were brought in to give full protection to the Zone, a single saboteur could still succeed in closing the Canal. A new treaty, by fostering a friendly relationship with Panama, is most conducive to protecting the United States' interests in a free and open Canal.

3. During the life of the Treaty, the United States would retain primary responsibility for the operation and defense of the Canal. Gradually, during this period, Panama would assume more operational responsibility until it had the necessary expertise to assume full control. This time period is to be at least 20 years; certainly long enough for Panamanians to learn how to operate the Canal. The transition phase, likewise, means that it would not be until the year 2000 that the United States would retire as the principal party in the defense and operation of the Canal. This provides a considerable length of time to prepare all the parties concerned, both in Latin America and elsewhere, on the implications of the new relationship.

4. During the life of the Treaty, the United States will retain its base rights (although they will probably be reduced in number) and will retain its rights to intervene militarily. Furthermore, there is a proposed second treaty to be signed by other nations, guaranteeing the Canal's open and nondiscriminatory usage after Panama takes control. This document would also give the United States the right to intervene if the Canal became threatened or if access should be denied.

5. Panama has an economic self-interest in keeping the Canal operative; it derives more income from the Canal than from any other source.

OPPOSED:

1. The United States has a legal right to remain in the Canal Zone "in perpetuity" and as "if it were sovereign" according to the 1903 Treaty with Panama. The United States acquired the Zone by treaty and also by direct purchase, it has operated it evenhandedly for all nations since it was first opened in 1914. The decision of the Supreme Court in the 1907 Wilson v. Shaw case held that the United States has legal sovereignty and ownership for the purposes enumerated in the 1903 Treaty. This ruling was reaffirmed in 1972. (Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 1907.) "This new Republic (Panama) has by treaty granted to the United States rights, territorial and otherwise. . . It is hypercritical to contend that the title of the United States is imperfect, and that the territory described does not belong to this Nation because of the omission of some of the technical terms used in ordinary conveyances of real estate."

2. To relinquish the statutory right to remain in the Zone amounts to a classic giveaway, opposed by a majority of the American public. The building of the canal is an American achievement which amounted to the technological "moonshot" of its time, and which has remained a testimony to American creativity and ingenuity.

3. The Canal has great importance for U.S. military and economic policies. A significant amount of total U.S. trade passes through its locks. Although our aircraft carriers are too large to transit the Canal, all other Naval vehicles can. In limited war situations such as Korea and Vietnam, the Canal has great importance for both supply and military vessels. The necessity for the United States to maintain absolute control over the operations and defense of the Canal is even more evident during emergency or crisis situations where quick response and unquestioned access are necessary.

4. Although all Latin American nations have publicly called for a new treaty, there is ample reason to believe that this is more a pro forma diplomatic stance taken out of necessity rather than conviction. If the United States relinquishes the Canal, our power and standing both in Latin America and throughout the world would diminish. This is particularly the case in the light of recent United States retreats from other areas of the world. A Canal treaty seen in this perspective would be interpreted as another example of the continued erosion of American will-power and influence.

5. Panama is a weak and unstable country controlled by a nationalist dictator known for pro-Communist sympathies. General Torrijos is on excellent terms with Fidel Castro and he has, on several occasions, deliberately embarrassed the United States in front of "third world" audiences. There is the possibility that in the hands of Torrijos the Canal might fall under Communist influence, or that the United States might be denied access. Almost certainly tolls would rise dramatically. In short, once the United States relinquishes control, it will be subject to the intentions and capabilities of Panama's dictator -- none of which can be fully anticipated.

6. Torrijos' regime has been a consistent violator of human rights inside Panama. In light of President Carter's emphasis on human rights, especially since that issue has taken on important symbolic and concrete meaning throughout Latin America, the United States would be guilty of bold hypocrisy in relinquishing the Canal.

7. Over the last decade, the Soviets have made monumental strategic gains at the expense of the West. The Kremlin has moved into a number of power vacuums during this time and is expected to attempt to gain control over the Canal, either remotely or directly, should the United States relinquish its treaty rights. The Canal is seen as a vital "choke point" in part of a global power struggle directly related to the security of the United States and the West.

In fact, the Soviets, who do not even have diplomatic relations with Panama, have recently concluded tentative economic and commercial agreements with that country. It is possible that the Soviets will move to supply engineers to operate the canal lock system as a preliminary move toward further influence over operation and control of the canal as the Americans withdraw.

CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

The Carter Administration is aware that it will have a difficult time in persuading the Senate to ratify the new treaty, and the American public to accept it. Polls indicate that the majority of the American public opposes any treaty which relinquishes sovereignty over the Zone and control of the Canal.

Although ratification will be difficult, the next few months are viewed as more favorable for proponents than the months approaching, or during 1978, which is an election year for one-third of the Members of the Senate. Further, most of the comprehensive package of payments to Panama is presented in a way which would not require Congressional action, reducing the possibility for friction and disagreement with the House of Representatives.

Ratification of a new treaty is effected by agreement of two-thirds of the Senate. However, the House of Representatives is also expected to participate in the debate on the broad package of proposals designed to relinquish the Canal, as

disposition of United States territory and other property of the United States is involved. Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides that only the Congress has the authority to dispose of "the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Two interrelated considerations should be examined as the terms of the actual treaty are studied. The first is the necessity for the Canal to remain open at all times to international shipping. The second is to assure American sovereignty until the turn of the century when the property and territory would be ultimately relinquished.

Currently, two treaties govern the status of the Canal. The Hay-Bunna-Varilla Treaty of 1903 discusses the rights of the United States and is described earlier. The Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1900 is between the United States and Britain wherein the United States pledges to keep any canal across the isthmus free and open to all nations, without discrimination. Panama has no such obligation, and would not be hindered from either denying transit or imposing discriminatory tolls.

Secondly, the proposed new treaty would require the gradual ceding to Panama of control over the operation of the Canal. However, any comprehensive transfer of jurisdictional rights before the turn of the century could be interpreted as a ceding of sovereignty. With sovereignty prematurely divested, (either by implication or otherwise) it would not be difficult to harass the United States on every matter not specifically dealt with in the treaty.

Should sovereignty be prematurely relinquished under the new treaty, the power of the new sovereign to evict would invite international pressures to that end, and agitation could be encouraged and intensified. The pattern of revolutionary turmoil and frequent changeovers in governments indicate that Panama would not be resistant to such pressures.

A lesson can be drawn from the Suez Canal where an ostensibly private company, with British government participation, operated under the sovereignty of another country. Rights retained by the British to protect their property, and the declaration of the Convention of Constantinople guaranteeing right of passage to vessels of all nations were of no avail when Egypt expropriated and later closed the Canal. Similarly, a new treaty with Panama as sovereign would not insure unimpeded passage through the Canal nor would it particularly deter expropriation of the Canal.

It is believed that Panama intends to raise the tolls substantially once it controls the operation of the Canal. Panama's representatives have made statements to the effect that they would like the tolls to be raised sharply, and that they do not intend to "subsidize" world shipping.

With respect to security of the Canal, the control of the Zone is as important as is control over the Canal. The Zone acts as a buffer area for any disturbances which may occur. This defensive buffer will be lost should the Zone merge into Panama, and the Canal would then be truly indefensible.

If the United States were dealing with a nation whose governmental stability was well-established and whose ideological leanings were compatible with our own, the question of the Treaty would be solved without controversy -- if it were to arise at all. Under circumstances which exist today -- and it is with existing circumstances which we must deal -- it seems difficult to accept that the transfer of sovereignty would remove an irritant and bring about improved relations with Panama and/or Latin America. In attempting to appease and accommodate hostile ideological elements, the United States, at its peril, may be ignoring valid lessons of history.

United States
CAN THE SOVIETS SURVIVE A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE?

Most of us in Military Intelligence are generally aware that the Soviets are better prepared to survive a nuclear exchange than is the United States. Risking a test of that survivability is, of course, a different matter, but the fact remains that we have largely ignored civil defense and have done little in the United States since World War II to harden military and industrial facilities, let alone educate the people on how to survive a nuclear attack. Major General George Keegan, USAF, former United States Air Force Intelligence Chief, in a recent exclusive interview which appeared in HUMAN EVENTS, confirms this assessment and predicts that a nuclear exchange now would result in 160 million casualties on our side compared to about 5 million Soviet casualties. He also expressed the opinion that while the United States would be devastated, the Soviets could reconstitute themselves as a viable power in short order.

GEN Keegan went on to describe the upgrading of the Soviet civil defense program. "After World War II," he said, "the Soviets determined that they could protect their population and they undertook a series of massive programs which reached their peak a few years ago when Col. Gen. Alexander Altunin, a Deputy Minister of Defense, was appointed the Chief of Soviet civil defense. Today, he is a four-star general. He is in charge of all civilian, industrial and military hardening and civil defense measures in the Soviet Union."

For good measure, Altunin is a member of the General Staff, a member of the Council of Ministers, and a Deputy Minister of Defense. "Thus, civil defense is under a man of unprecedented power with the authority and budget to carry out the single most aggressive peacetime civil defense program in recorded history." No other nation in the world has a civil defense program with this much actual authority at the top echelons.

GEN Keegan goes on to say that in addition, "Altunin has over 200 general officers on active duty from the several services, serving directly on his staff, or in command of civil defense in all the major cities of the Soviet Union. He is known to have many dozens of regiments of civil defense troops that are assigned principally to supervising city defense throughout the Soviet Union. His organization includes several large military academies like the Air Force Academy or West Point devoted exclusively to training civil defense officers."

"After four years of the most intensive training in civil defense, they graduate with the equivalent of a college degree, are commissioned second lieutenants, and spend their entire 35 to 50 year career in civil defense. Ultimately, these young officers become the commanders of civil defense detachments throughout the cities of the Soviet Union."

"In addition, General Altunin has established a series of civil defense training villages in all the major cities of the Soviet Union. These giant training villages contain every known facility for civil defense. They do fire-fighting, they rescue people, and they train inside destroyed buildings. There are some of these in every major urban center of the Soviet Union. Altunin is also in charge, through the various industrial ministries, of a widespread program to defend workers -- the industrial population."

GEN Keegan states, "the evidence shows that every major factory is equipped with a giant underground shelter hardened to 145 pounds per square inch. Thus, the entire worker population is protected against all but a direct nuclear hit. Every civilian apartment house built since 1960 has a similar basement shelter, so that it is no longer necessary to evacuate the cities in case of attack."

"This evidence is available from emigres and defectors - including engineers who helped design and build some of these shelters. Soviet citizens, now in the

United States who, for the past 15 years, played a key role in the building of the shelters for the civilian population, the industrial population and for various military facilities, reconfirm the information. There are also many readily available Soviet publications, news articles, and directives on the subject. GEN Keegan observed, "there is no longer any mystery about the matter of Soviet civil defense, the real mystery is that you cannot get senior officials in the United States Government to believe!" "Perhaps because to believe would simply be to put detente, SALT, and the ABM treaty of 1972 in an extremely adverse light."

"The 1972 ABM treaty restricted the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defenses, and as a condition to that treaty, it was agreed by both sides that they would not shelter their civilian populations. At the time, there was a great deal of evidence that the Soviets had a good civil defense program but for reasons unexplained, this evidence was ignored. As a result, General Keegan concludes, "The Soviets today must perceive they have an important strategic advantage over the United States in their ability to protect their civilian, industrial and military populations."

As to other systems of defense, General Keegan went on to comment that, "The Soviets have the most extravagant system of radars in the world -- they have over 5000 radars to defend their country to our 300; they have 12000 SAM's on launchers, hardened and protected against attack; they have built the world's most extensive array of over-the-horizon radars at costs estimated to be somewhere between \$5 and \$10 billion." "I believe," he went on to say, "these radars are now complete and are capable of detecting United States missiles as they are launched. They are capable of detecting United States bombers shortly after launch and tracking them."

General Keegan went on stating, "The Soviets have put virtually all of their major command centers under ground and are currently in the midst of hardening most of their several thousand battlefield surveillance radars. Also, the Soviets are now developing a high-energy beam weapon technology (they've been working on this for 20 years or so) with which they must have high promise that they are going to succeed in neutralizing the ballistic missile threat."

"So, if you end up a decade from now with a situation in which no aircraft can penetrate the Soviet Union, our ballistic missiles cannot get through, and in which our ballistic missile-carrying submarines are subjected to an increasing Soviet capability in anti-submarine warfare, then where is the US ability to deter aggression at any scale going to be?"

General Keegan closed by saying, "I regret deeply that we seem once again to be indulging in the kind of folly which invited Hitler's aggression, an aggression which could have been prevented. World War II - I think most will agree with me - was the most avoidable war in history. Some 40 million people died needlessly in that war and through the action we are now taking in this country, blindly and blithely, it seems to me that we are inviting an ever-increasing scale of aggression by the Soviets. That's what I am concerned about."

The apparent high survivability of the Soviet Union, vis-a-vis the United States during a nuclear exchange clearly is an advantage which will allow the Soviets to proceed on their present course with a great deal of confidence. They probably believe that our leadership is aware of our disadvantage, but that may be a miscalculation on the Soviet's part. It may be that we are only beginning to see the implications of Soviet preparedness and are unwilling to accept it. The political cost of admitting such a mistake would be enormous. Not to mention the billions of dollars that would have to be diverted from social and domestic programs to provide for an adequate civil defense - a diversion of monies which is probably unacceptable to the present political leadership. The result of our "head in the sand" attitudes toward civil defense and hardening expenditures may be the loss of our freedom - - - and ultimately our Nation.

Military Intelligence professionals have an obligation to continually assess the capability of the Soviet Union not only to wage war, but to survive a war. This capability must be constantly compared with our own capacity for war and for survival. Every Infantryman who has fought a war knows that the amount of ammunition

and effort required to dislodge or destroy a determined enemy is in direct proportion to how well the enemy is dug in. Whereas the analogy may seem simplistic, in a broader sense, the same is true of Nations.

A strong defense is our only defense.

Have You Wondered?

Q. What is the purpose of NMIA?

A. To provide a forum to enhance the intelligence profession. This is accomplished through the actions and public relations activities of the organization, particularly at the national level. All influential professions enjoy the prestige and lobbying power of a nationally recognized organization of the type represented by the NATIONAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSOCIATION.

Q. How does the NMIA gain national recognition?

A. Through the attainment of a large number of members representing all phases of the intelligence profession. Through our scholarship program which brings favorable national publicity to the Association. Through the AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL, the published forum of the Association.

Q. How does the NMIA attain a large membership base?

A. Through a vigorous recruitment program initiated mostly at the local Chapter level. Recruitment should be targeted to include all services, and all ranks, as well as interested civilians and retirees.

Q. What does the NMIA offer its membership?

A. Initially, affiliation with a growing organization having the potential to significantly improve the image and prestige of the intelligence profession and thus the professional in it. Later, after attainment of suitable national recognition, a significant forum through which to express ideas, concerns, and recommendations for improving the image and prestige of the profession.

Q. Why doesn't NMIA offer more in the way of NOW benefits to its members?

A. It is a new and growing organization that has just turned the corner toward gaining national recognition and influence. NMIA is only four years old. Most national organizations take several years to mature. We have made remarkable progress already and are gaining momentum.

Q. Why were the dues raised and what does this increased revenue buy?

A. To gain national recognition and expand the membership base to include all service representation, the NMIA executive offices were moved from Sierra Vista, Arizona to the Washington, D.C. area. Concurrently, a permanent Executive Secretary was hired at a salary of \$350.00 per month. The balance of the dues revenue goes to pay for printing (your magazine), mailing and administrative costs of the organization. Plans are in the mill to derive additional revenue through advertisement.

Q. Why do we no longer receive the MI Magazine?

A. The direct affiliation between NMIA and MI Magazine was an honest mistake. Originally intended as an enticement to membership, it eventually back-fired by tying the national organization too closely to an Army publication, and thereby, to a single service. Additionally, the printing and distribution costs of MI Magazine used up the largest portion of dues revenue and left little to operate the national organization. Further, the decision to move the national headquarters to Washington precluded a continued tie-in with MI Magazine. The option to renew their MI Magazine was kept open to those members who so desired.

Q. Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700100001-5
Why are no General Officers on the Board of Directors? Does this signify a lack of support?

A. Membership on the Board of Directors was initially given automatically to incumbents holding positions of Commanders of DIA, ASA, USAICS, USASATC&S, and ACSI, DA. During the 1976 National Convention, it was decided that the use of incumbency positions for the Board of Directors gave too much Army flavor to the organization. Therefore, it was decided to create an Advisory Board consisting of prominent military and civilian individuals. Actions are underway to decide the composition of the Board and obtain commitments to serve on it. In the interim, LTG Aaron, DIA; MG Thompson, ACSI; BG Freeze, USAINTA, and BG Stubblebine, USAICS, have given NMIA assurance of their continued support.

Q. What are the current goals of NMIA?

A. The current goals include:

(1) Establishment of a truly national organization with a broad base of membership consisting of all services, interests, and areas. Representatives from the Air Force and Navy were elected to the Board during the 1977 National Convention.

(2) Solidify the national organization in the Washington area so that it may be responsive to the membership and particularly to the needs of local Chapters.

(3) Publication of an NMIA Magazine with paid advertisements designed to provide sufficient revenue to finance the national operation.

(4) Continued growth in scope and prominence of service activities such as scholarship awards and the establishment of an Intelligence Hall of Fame.

Summer is over. New replacements are in. Now is the time to begin a concerted membership drive to expand the base of the NMIA operation and bring in some new vigor and initiative into our organization. The success of any organization depends on its members. Let's give it our very best -- because we are THE BEST!

Scholarship Winners Write

ROBIN WRITES--

I would like to thank the National Military Intelligence Association for my Scholarship Award. I cannot express how happy and grateful I am. It was a pleasure and great honor for me to accept the award. I can assure you the money will be a great help in attributing to my education and will be wisely put to use.

I will be attending the University of Maryland, College Park. I will be moving in August 19 and will start classes August 24, 1977. I am continuing with my plans for a B.S. in Law Enforcement. I will do my best to make everyone proud of me and continue to correspond to let you know how I'm doing. Thank you again for the honor given me.

Sincerely, Robin J. Watt

MARK WRITES--

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and the Scholarship Committee for the National Military Intelligence Association's Scholarship Award. I am deeply grateful for the honor which you and the members of the Association bestowed on me. I hope I shall be able to live up to the high standards of honor, dedication and excellence that the National Military Intelligence Association and its members stand for.

In August, I enrolled at the University of Texas at Austin where I am currently pursuing a combined Business/Pre-Law Major.

Sincerely yours, Mark G. McGlade

INNER SANCTUM

As the White Rabbit in Wonderland kept exclaiming before he fell into a hole, "I'm late, late, LATE!" The fact is -- we aren't really late, this is the FALL ISSUE -- we just hopped over the Summer Issue. Several reasons for this. The last MI Magazine we bought put us too close to the bottom of the treasury and we needed to recoup the loss. This has now been accomplished. Time was also required to re-settle the records and to insure that our Administrative house was in order after the move from Arizona. We had to be certain that we could continue the good work of Jim Chambers and keep up with the membership --- come hell or high water!

But now, you see, there really is an NMIA. We haven't fallen down the Rabbit hole, and your Association is alive and well. Starting now, you will hear a great deal more from it.

Let's talk about the future. We intend to get real ambitious with NMIA's new JOURNAL. It is the first professional intelligence magazine ever printed outside of "official" circles. Our IRS standing recognizes NMIA as a professional non-profit organization and within the limits of good taste, good sense and Uncle Sam's security rules, we can write what we please, discuss what we please and freely exchange ideas. The AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL should, therefore, be reflective of your desires and interests. It is now your forum. Your magazine and your door to understanding and communicating with others in the intelligence community.

In future issues, we plan to include those things you want to see. The content is largely up to you. I hope to see Letters to the Editor, articles from Members; more special features on timely subjects, a lot more professional news, and a much expanded Chapter coverage -- with pictures, if possible. Each issue should be better than the last.

At the moment, a Quarterly publication seems prudent, but we hope to publish more frequently as time goes on. All that is required is support from the Membership. This support must be in the way of articles. The desire to see NMIA and its voice (the JOURNAL) succeed and the constant recruitment of new Members. The more Members, the more ideas and the more money is available to produce a better magazine more frequently.

Speaking of magazine issues, the Winter Issue of the AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL is due at the printer by 16 January 1978. I should have your golden words by mid-December if you want to be published. Naturally, what cannot be used for the Winter Issue may well appear in future issues, but it will help the planning if you keep articles coming in. Bear in mind that some editing will take place in order to fit the format or for other reasons, but no major changes will take place without a consultation with the author.

In other matters, I would appreciate the Membership advising me as early as possible of changes in addresses. With a staff of two, we need all the help we can get. I also want to be certain that the JOURNAL connects with whatever trench, sea, or airspace you happen to be occupying. The Pony Express moves slowly these days; so try to write early -- and often.

In sum, the cards still show that there is a NMIA in your present -- and your future. I hope this issue of the AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL will be of interest to you and prove to be a great beginning of a new era for your Association.

Sincerely,

Chuck Thoman
Executive Secretary

It is the intent of the JOURNAL to cover Chapter activities in each issue. To do this, takes input from the Chapters. Chapter Presidents are urged to keep in touch with the Executive Secretary so that your Chapter is represented. Pictures are welcome. Black and white preferred.

NMIA's newest Chapter is being established in Hawaii and members for the ALOHA CHAPTER are being recruited from all services. With all the multi-service units on the island of Oahu, the ALOHA CHAPTER should be one of NMIA's largest and should rival the POTOMAC CHAPTER in Washington for the largest multi-service membership. If you wish to join ALOHA CHAPTER, please contact LTC Dick Jones, Post Office Box 966, Aiea, Hawaii 96701. ALOHA's Constitution and By-Laws are being processed.

NMIA also welcomes the COTTON BLUFF CHAPTER to the ranks. The COTTON BLUFF CHAPTER held its first meeting on 13 August in Memphis and ratified their Constitution and By-Laws. They look for a large membership in an area where members will come primarily from reserve units. The man responsible for much of COTTON BLUFF's birth is 1SG James H. Dudley, currently Vice President. The President is COL Date T. Wells who also comes in for his share of the credit.

National Headquarters continues to hear regularly from the GARDEN STATE CHAPTER as they keep adding to their membership rolls. COL John J. Fatum is the new President. Keep up the good work. Your efforts are very much appreciated.

ALAMO CHAPTER at Fort Sam Houston has recently elected MAJ Gerald Lewis as President. After a July picnic and general membership drive, they are settling down to consolidate and move out as one of our most active Chapters. BG Joseph R. Ulatoski, FORSCOM/DCSI addressed the group in April, presenting a most inspiring discussion of intelligence salesmanship.

The HERITAGE CHAPTER reports itself alive and well in New England. It had better be since it is the Chapter of our new President, COL Bill Powell. LTC Pretto is the President of the Chapter.

The POTOMAC CHAPTER (DIA) continues to march with regular meetings under its new President, Lee Webb. LTG Aaron, the new Deputy Director of DIA has been a guest as have a number of other interesting speakers.

After a terrific job of organizing the Convention, the CHESAPEAKE CHAPTER has breathed a sign of relief, and has taken most of the summer off - well deserved. The JOURNAL is assured, however, that great events are underway and we will have a complete report for the Winter Issue.

The FORT SILL CHAPTER of NMIA is also forming and should be receiving its Charter soon. FORT SILL actually got going earlier this year and reported some 35 members with MAJ Edgar L. Moore as its President. Unfortunately the change over of Headquarters delayed approval, but it's on its way!

Speaking of summer, now that it is over and we are all getting back to serious business - let's hear from you. Memberships are coming in from all over the country (and the world) but the Chapters are keeping all the news to themselves. The Winter Issue will be published in January. We need to hear from you in December.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL CHAPTER? To promote interest in the NMIA by offering a forum for speakers and programs of interest to members of the intelligence community. To expand the sphere of contacts, both professionally and socially, for those who work in the field of military intelligence. To assure that NMIA remains a viable organization that can effectively represent the interests of intelligence professionals. The success of local programs depends primarily on the initiative and imagination of the local administration. The National organization stands ready to help when called upon for assistance.

ENLISTED MEMBERS ARE IMPORTANT TO NMIA

During our recent Convention-77 at Fort Meade, I had the opportunity on several occasions to talk to enlisted personnel about NMIA. I gained a pretty good insight on how they view our organization. Where they think we are. Where they think we are headed. One man didn't hesitate to tell me that NMIA was an "officers outfit and all they want is the enlisted dues." There were others that were apprehensive about the sincerity of the NMIA Board and its attempts to recruit enlisted members. Needless to say, these people were either misinformed or uninformed about the intentions of our organization. This is my chance to put the record straight. Enlisted personnel have been active in NMIA at the national level since its inception in January, 1974.



CSM Francis M. McCann, Vice-President

SGM ANGELO NICOLOSI served as a Board Member of the first regularly elected Board. In 1975, I was elected for a three-year term. In 1976, MSG PAUL FAZENBAKER and SSG JIM KISH were elected to the Board. In 1977, SSG LAWRENCE FOX, was elected to the Board. There are currently four enlisted men serving on the National Board. In 1977, MSG PAUL FAZENBAKER served as the Chairman of the Scholarship Committee and I served as the Chairman of the Convention Committee and as a member of the Nominating Committee. I was also elected as Vice President in June, 1977. Enlisted personnel have been and will continue to be important parts of the Association. Our President, Colonel Bill Powell and our Past Presidents, Colonel Jack Dalton, LTG Vernon Walters, LTG Dan Graham and Colonel Chuck Thomann, have all emphasized the importance to NMIA of our enlisted members. It was their genuine sincerity that kept me as an active member. Most enlisted members also recognize this sincerity.

Remember, NMIA offers a unique opportunity for individuals, whether professionally active or not, Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine, civilian or military, officer or enlisted with an interest in military intelligence to share their knowledge with others engaged in military intelligence. We have come a long way since 1974 when Colonel Jack Dalton, our first President, and LTC Carey Tomlinson, our first Secretary worked hard and put in a lot of time and personal expense to get NMIA going. Each year, we get a little better. Hopefully, next year, at our Convention in Kileen, Texas, we will be well on our way with most of the "growing pains" behind us.

It is YOUR organization!

We solicit your support! We ask for your comments, suggestions and criticism.

LET US HEAR FROM Y-O-U!

Sincerely,

Frank

~~N. M. I.~~ Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700100001-5

~~National Military Intelligence Association~~

1606 LAUREL LANE, RT. 10

ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21401



APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

MEMBERSHIP ELIGIBILITY

A member shall be a person who is actively engaged in Military Intelligence, or who, by reason of education, profession or experience is interested in the development of Military Intelligence.

PRIVILEGES RECEIVED FROM MEMBERSHIP

All issues of the Association News Letter, the official publication of the Association.

The right to vote, hold office and participate in all activities of the Association.

A membership identification card and the right to display a membership certificate. A close relationship with other intelligence professionals throughout the world.

GENERAL INFORMATION FOR APPLICANTS

The application should be sent to the Association. Remittance payable to the National Military Intelligence Association should accompany the application.

The cost of a Membership Certificate is \$2.00. If desired, include this in the amount of remittance. Certificate money is used for NMIA Scholarships.

APPLICATION

First Name

Middle Initial

Last Name

Rank

I hereby apply for Membership in the National Military Intelligence Association and enclose \$10.00 dues, and \$_____ for a membership certificate. I enclose and additional \$_____ for the NMIA Scholarship Fund.

Mailing Address

(Street & No., City, State, Zip Code)

Social Security No.

Present Employment & Title

Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002700100001-5

Date

NMIA Chapter

Signature of Applicant

National Military Intelligence Assn
1606 Laurel Lane, Rt. 10
Annapolis, Maryland 21401

